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INSTRUMENTALISM, CONFLICT AND THE
TEMPORALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN
SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY
In Being and Nothingness 1 Sartre claims that the essence of
relations between human beings is conflict. (BN, 555) 2 In his
posthumously published essay, Truth and Existence 3, Sartre seems to
allow for a wider variety of human relationships. I will argue here that
this greater variety is available to human beings because, according to
the way Sartre describes consciousness in Truth and Existence, our
awareness is less tightly identified with our projects than certain
sections of Being and Nothingness would seem to suggest. How is
such a lessening of identification possible? My thesis here is that, if we
reconsider Sartre's notion of consciousness as a temporal synthesis of
past, present, and future, then we can see how we need not be tightly
identified with our projects because the temporal dimension of the past
has a tendency to puB us back from such an identification.
Finally, I will argue that the specific kind of conflict that
derives trom the attempt to reduce both ourselves and others to the
status of a pure instrument might be avoided. I will attempt to show
how Sartre describes an alternative attitude that he characterizes in
Truth and Existence as one in which we "enjoy Being." (TE, 30) While
such an attitude does not pennit the elimination ofall kinds of conflict4,
I lean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Pocket Books,
1966. p. 555. Henceforth - BN.
2 See also Ronald Aronson, Jean-Paul Sartre: Philosophy in the World. London: NLB, 1980, p.
133, and Thomas Anderson, Sartre's Two Ethics. Chicago: Open Court, 1993. p. 27.
3 lean-Paul Sartre, Truth and Existence. Original Text estabIished and annotated by Arlette
Elkaim-Sartre, trans. Adrian van den Hoven, ed. Ronald Aronson. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992. Henceforth - TE.
4 For a description of positive conflict based upon reciprocity and independence see Adrian
Mirvish, "Sartre and the Problem of other (Embodied) Minds," p. 83, n. 48, Sartre Studies
International, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1996.
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it does provide us with other ways of viewing people besides their
potential utility. This enjoyment of being described by Sartre might
enable us to appreciate the autonomy of others and to enter into a
variety ofhuman relationships that are not strictly instrumental.
The Limits of Instrumentality
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre argues that to the extent that I
am a being ofpossibilities, 1am an instrumentalizing being. (BN, 429) I
am, he says, a lived tool. (BN, 426) 1 can also, according to Sartre,
apprehend the other as an object that 1 can use for my own ends, and
which I can utilize in connection with other instruments.(BN, 446)
In Truth and Existence, Sartre seems to have modulated his
position on our instrumental attitudes. 1 can engage in other relations
besides those that are prescribed by my ends. Being, he says, "can
reveal itself as in no way (Sartre's italics) being able to sustain the
operational role we want it to play." (TE, 69) EIsewhere in the same
essay he argues that a strictly instrumental knowledge is obscure and
abstract. (TE, 29) My revelation of the people and things around me
always gives me more knowledge than I had originally demanded from
a purely instrumental perspective. (TE, 47) Sartre argues that 1 am not
suppressed in my end (TE, 71), suggesting that my consciousness has
an ontological status not immediately dependent upon my project.
In contrast to a certain kind of project which involves at
instrumental appropriation, Sartre describes another kind of project as
one characterized by abstaining from such appropriation. (TE, 30) To
want the truth, according to Sartre, is to prefer Being to anything else.
(Ibid.) It is to prefer Being "even in catastrophic form" simply because
it iso (Ibid.) Sartre strongly implies here that he believes that the
illumination ofthe world that 1 gain as I pursue my ends requires me to
go beyond my particular instrumental complex, meaning that my
comprehension of the world around me, including my encounter with
other people, is not limited to instrumentality. I am not, according to
Sartre, "impaled on the vector of means-and-ends.ll (TE, 69)Sartre,
however, is not prepared to dispense with ends as necessary to my
\illumination of the world. He argues that my ends group the "beings
Ipresent" to me into a meaningful unity (TE, 18), and that Being
\"specifies itself' as I specify my ends. (TE, 29) Therefore, while ends
are not all-encompassing, neither can they be eliminated.
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If we attempt to dispense with the notion of ends from Sartre's
conception of consciousness, we immediately TUn into problems. My
consciousness is, for Sartre, not a magic lalltern (BN, 171), a term of
Sartre's which I take to indicate a kind of enigmatic illumination which
expands across my landscape for no apparent purpose. In Sartre's
model of consciousness, I misunderstand myself if I conceive of my
awareness as a passive milieu.5
I would argue that Sartre's understanding of the role that ends
play in the operation of my consciousness is best understood when
connected to his understanding of temporality. My consciousness, for
Sartre, is nothing without a unifying temporal synthesis.6 As I engage
in this synthesis I am, in asense, always outside of myself, always
already in my future, and always already in my past.7 According to
Sartre's understanding of temporality in Part Two, Chapter Two of
Being and Nothingness, I am not conscious unless lamaware of some
kind ofpast. (BN, 198) "Birth", he says, "is the upsurge ofthe absolute
relation of Pastness as the ekstatic being of the For-itself in the In-
itself." (BN, 199)
To be born, then, is to be born with a past in the sense that to
be conscious is always to be conscious of a past. My consciousness is
not completely subordinated to its ends because the world does not
disappear f or me as my ends change or as my possibilities collapse.
The way the world looks in the absence of a viable project is weH
described by Sartre in a footnote to What is Literature?, written during
the same period that he wrote Truth and Existence:
When the instruments are broken and unusable, when plans are
blasted and effort is useless, the world appears with a childlike and
terrible freshness, without supports, without paths. tt 8
How is it that I can apprehend the world with this "childlike and
terrible freshness" in the absence of an enserrlble of ends and means
deployed in the present moment? I would argue that such an
appearance is possible because even in the face of change and failure,
my past remains, and what Sartre calls the this-objects and the that-
5 See Manfred Frank, What Is Neostructuralism?, trans. Sabine
Wilke and Richard Gray. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1989) p. 195.
6 Franck, Ibid.
7 Franck, Op. Cit., p. 196
8 What Is Literature?, trans, Bemard Prechtman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988,
p. 334, n. 4.
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objects (BN, 199) of my past remain for me as bounded by my
recoIIection ofthem.
My experience of objects, however, can never be limited to a
simple recollection of my paste I must, Sartre argues, intuit the world
as a temporal whole, with each ecstatic dimension appearing on the
foundation of a synthetic totality. (BN, 159) If no one of the three
dimensions oftime can exist without the other, then it is impossible for
me to have a past without a future, or a future without a paste Now, my
project is oriented towards the future, that is, as anticipating a relation
which is not yet. According to Sartre's understanding of temporality, I
cannot have a pure future, but can only apprehend it in synthesis with
my past and present.
If I cannot have a pure future, then it should follow that neither
can I have a pure project, given that my project is oriented towards the
future, and my consciousness is always more than an anticipation of
what may come. The mutual dependency of my past and my future
should, then, create a kind of temporal space which gives me a certain
freedom in relation to my own instrumental complex. if I can evaluate
my past and present in terms of my future, I can also evaluate my future
in terms ofmy past and present.
The ways in which I can understand consciousness, then, should
not be limited to either an activity in which I must fully instrumentalize
n1y environment, on the one hand, or discover it as already illuminated,
on the other. The possibilities created by the original temporal
synthesis would explain why, when we turn to Truth and Existence, we
find that Sartre considers a strictly instrumental approach to reality to
be abstract and obscure. (TE, 29) If I insist on attempting to view the
people and things in my environment purely in tenns of their utility,
then I am attempting to ignore the other temporal dimensions in which
they appear to me. I am attempting to view adependent aspect of the
person or thing as an independent whole and, thus, in a sense that
Husserl mipt use the term, I am viewing the concrete person or thing
abstractly.
According to Sartre, the past is not a possibility, but rather a kind
of being-in-itself in which possibility has been consumed. (BN, 170) If
this is the case, then I do not, in good f aith, perceive either myself or
others as pure possibilities, but rather as temporal ensembles which
9 For arelevant discussion of Husserl's conception ofparts and wholes, as weH as abstract-
concrete relations see David Bell, Husserl. London: Routledge, 1990. pp. 17-46.
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linclude relations which appear in ways other than as possibilities.
iReturning to Being and Nothingness, we fmd Sartre arguing that I view
Ithe other as another instrumental complex that arises within my own
complex and needs to be surpassed. (BN, 428) Given the notion of
temporal synthesis, however, if I can view other people as futures
which are separate f rom mine, I also should be able to view them as
pasts and presents which are equally separate. since, according to
Sartre, I can only conceive of the future in connection with past, and
present, then I should also only be able to view other people's distinct
futures in connection with equally distinct pasts, and presents. The
alternative would be that I could somehow view the temporality of
others in a way that I cannot view my own temporality, namely, as pure
future. Because I can view other people as having a past as weIl as a
future, I can view them as beings who are not reducible to either their
own possibilities or to mine.
Even supposing that other people would attempt to subordinate
themselves to me as pure tools, the temporal unity of consciousness
should render this extremely difficult. If the pasts of other people pull
them back from a complete identification with their own projects, then
those pasts should equally puB them back from a complete
identification with mine. Whether they attempt to identify with my
plans for them or to resist such an incorporation, the undertow of the
past prevents them frorn becoming pure possibilities situated within
any particular instrumental complex, whether it be mine or theirs.
While Sartre does assert in Being and Nothingness that
instrumentality is primary (BN, 428), his assertion does not necessarily
follow from the rest ofhis ontology. Part Three, Chapter Two ofBeing
and Nothingness does not completely square with Part Two, Chapter
Two. In Part Three, Sartre seems to unnecessarily promote the third
eckstasis by claiming the primacy of instrumentality, whereas in Part
Two he seems to argue that the pennanent elevation of one temporal
moment is not possible.
Showing what consciousness need not do, however, is not the
same as showing what it can do. When I say that I do not have to
attempt to reduce the Other to a mere means to my own ends, I say
nothing about what other kinds of relationships I might engage in with
that person. In Truth and Existence, sartre enables us to think more
clearly about these possibilities by arguing that the drive towards utility
is not inexorable. He also provides material that suggests alternatives
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to a compulsive instrumentalism.
Enjoyment and the Verifying Project
In Truth and Existence, Sartre describes another stance towards
the world which, while it necessarily includes the future dimension of
temporality, is not reducible to a purely instrumentalizing attitude. He
refers to this stance as the verifying project, and immediately infonns
us that such a project presupposes a "taste for Being." (TE, 28) In
addition to pursuing my goals, I want to verify that my ends and means
are supportable in the world. Sartre here is giving me a reason why I
should take a hearty interest in the truthlO, and what he refers to as my
taste for Being is supposed to allow me both to withstand and to
honestly accept negative answers that arise out of this process.
If I am engaged in the world, I wish to know to what extent my
projects possess the possibility of succeeding. I may persist in an
endeavor even in the face of probable defeat because I think the
possible outcome is important enough to risk the odds, or I might wish
to make a moral example out of my defeat, but if I adopt an attitude of
blithe disregard for the feasibility of my project, then it is at least
questionable whether I am actually engaged in a project in the world or
simply slipping into a dream. I I
According to Sartre, as I pursue my goals, I illuminate the
world around me. (TE, 29) I approach my goals, but I never, according
to Sartre, quite achieve them, in the sense that I am not able to fully
appropriate them. (TE, 30) Sartre's description, here, suggests the
nihilating activity that, in Being and Nothingness, he describes as the
necessity of the conscious subject to distance itself from its object.
(BN, 57) He says, in Truth and Existence, that a simple nothingness
separates me forever from the objects of my actions. (TE, 29) At this
point, one might expect Sartre to revert to his contention in Being and
10 According to Thomas Anderson, Sartre's description of the process of verification in Truth and
Existence remains insufficient
to justify truth as an intrinsic value. See Anderson, Sartre's Two Ethics, op. cit.,pp. 181-182, n.
54.
11 Will Kymlicka discusses ofthis problem within a different theoretical frarnework, but uses
some of the same examples as Sartre and comes to similar conclusions. See Will Kimlycka,
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 16-
18.
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Nothingness that human reality is a useless passion. (BN, 784)
Instead, he attempts to show that the structure of
consciousness, as he understands i-t, creates the necessary
preconditions for enjoyment. (TE, 29) My relationship to the world
around me, he says, is both irritating and voluptuous. (Ibid.) The
pursuit of my goals, he argues, is irritating because my anticipated
achievement of them suggests a unity which is denied me. (TE, 29) My
effort to appropriate my goal is bound to fail, in one sense, because of
the pennanent distance between me and my object which is required by
consciousness.
This "taste for Being", however, while it contains an
unavoidable amount of frustration, also could entail a particular kind of
enjoyment which is not possible without the nihilating activity of
consciousness. While Sartre does not use the term nihilation in Truth
and Existence, his description of the distancing activity of
consciousness appears to be the same as the activity he describes by
that same tenn in Being and Nothingness as an ontological
characteristic of human reality. (BN, 58) The term, therefore, would
seem to be applicable. To love my goals, according to Sartre, is to
experience a kind of"absolute proximity." (TE, 30)
Given Sartre's understanding of consciousness, this relation of
absolute proximity would be impossible without the activity of
nihilation. A relation of proximity requires a distance, however smalI,
between subject and object. In order for that proximity to be absolute,
that distance must be irreducible. Since nihilation is, for Sartre, the
indispensable distancing activity of consciousness (BN, 68), it should
follow that this activity is necessary for the relation of absolute
proximity.
If I accept this absolute proximity as unavoidable, I can also
accept my goals, and the horizon that surrounds them as being, in an
ultimate sense, inappropriable. I acknowledge that, however intensely I
strive towards them, the irreducible distance between my consciousness
and my goals always remains as a transparent wall. I can recognize
that, when I attempt to completely appropriate the goals that I aspire
towards, I ignore the enjoyment that comes from being present to them.
Sartre does not offer a proof that the experience of being present
to something is sufficient in itselfto constitute enjoyment. His implicit
argument, however, seems to be that, since nihilation is a necessary
condition for awareness because of the distance it creates between
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subject and object, and since I can only enjoy something that I am
aware of, then it is possible for me to appreciate the necessary
condition for awareness as being itself a necessary condition for
enjoyment. There is a suggestion in Sartre's thinking, although not a
proof, that an appreciation of my own consciousness can be itself an
enjoyable experience.
With this appreciation, I can now begin to accept the people and
objects that I encounter in the world as separate from me, and as not
reducible to the roles that I would ascribe to them in my projects. A
moment of affirmation comes, according to Sartre, when I consciously
will the separation that exists between me and my goals because I
realize that without this separation I would never experience what he
calls their "compact density". (TE, 30) I would here argue that the term
compact density refers to the boundedness that renders my goals both
distinct from me and available for my enjoyment precisely because of
their distinctiveness.
In one sense, I create the distinctiveness of the object because I
illuminate it by the activity of my consciousness. Sartre argues that I
give the object an additional dimension to the extent that I "draw it
from the night ofBeing... (.)" (TE, 30) In another sense, however, I do
not create it because the distinctiveness of the object is not merely a
product of my own will. If it were, then the object would have no
distinctions of its own. Those characteristics which appear to
distinguish it would benothing more than projections of my own
predilections.(TE, 53) Sartre's argument here corresponds with his
more extended attempt in Being and Nothingness to demonstrate that
the objects ofour consciousness can not be reducible to our perceptions
ofthem. (BN, 17-21)
As I realize that one of the things that I enjoy is precisely my
illumination of the people and things of this world, I become more
interested in their illumination than in their appropriation. 12 I begin to
want the truth, Sartre says, "even in catastrophic fonn"" (TE, 30)
meaning that because I enjoy illuminating the people and things of the
world, and because I illuminate them as already existing (TE, 71), I
cease to want to reduce them to mere functions ofmy preferences. 13
12 Sartre seems to leave the possibility open that we ean never quite get rid ofthe desire to
appropriate whatever we enjoy, thereby also suggesting the permanent possibility for bad faith.
13 See Mirvish, "Sartre and the Problem of Other (Embodied) Minds," Sartre Studies
International, op. eil. p. 77. Mirvish refers to "the I inexhaustible wealth' that distinguishes my
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Thus, if I believe that I am engaged with another person in a
long-tenn, committed relationship, and the possibility arises for me to
discover that the other person does not share either the long term
preference or the intensity of the commitment, I wish to know this,
even though my knowledge will probably mean the end of the
relationship. Sartre uses the example of a marriage (TE, 31), but the
characteristics he describes could equally weIl be associated with a
wider set of possible on-going, cooperative relationships.
Such a knowledge is catastrophic to the goal of creating and
maintaining the particular desired relationship. Since I have already
chosen it as my goal, I am, up to the point of my discovery, operating
within the framework of a specific instrumental complex with its
"coefficients of adversity." (TE, 31) Such coefficients, in this case,
might include making sure that the time which I could have used for
another purpose is set aside for the activities involved in that
relationship, and that resources that I could have invested in other
pursuits are devoted to meeting the requirements of mutuality and
cooperation.
When I discover, however, that the desire for the relationship is
not mutual, the coefficients of time and resources become meaningless
within the framework of that particular instrumental complex. The end
which united that enserrlble of relations has vanished in the light of my
newly acquired knowledge. It: however, I am committed to the project
of verification, I will choose to acknowledge the truth that the desire
for such a relationship is not mutual. My field of action, in this
particular situation, has disappeared, and my project is canceled.
The possibility for a kind of enjoyment that is not dependent
upon that project, however, remains. Granted that this is not the same
kind ofpleasure that often accompanies a successful venture, one ofthe
implications of Sartre's thinking in Truth and Existence is that my
projects are never quite as successful as I would like f or them to be.
Therefore, my enjoyment of success is never complete. The quest for
merger that Sartre describes in Being and Nothingness (BN, 784) does
not seem to have disappeared in Truth and Existence because the
irritation of absolute proximity remains. The source of this irritation, I
would suggest, is the continuing desire for merging with my goal.
love of the real person from my experience of a mere image," and to "the experience of
excitement and challenge which are necessary for dealing with areal, truly loved person. tl
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Even though my enjoyment ofconsciousness is not 15
unadulterated, Sartre argues that it is bettor than the lure of a dream-
like state in which that absolute proximity is abolished. (TE, 53) When
I am in the real world I am seldom alone, and the refusal of other
people to fully cooperate with me serves as a kind of reminder,
although admittedly not as an ontological proof, that my existence is
usually not one of solitude. In Truth and Existence, the hell that Sartre
describes is not other people, but rather the prison-house of life in a
pure dream world.
In such a world, either everything always works, or nothing
ever works, which, sartre argues, yields more or less the same terrifying
results. (TE, 71) Sartre's point, here, I would argue, is not that reality is
good and dreams are bad, but that our comprehension of ends and
means is rendered difficult in a setting which is either purely adverse or
purely compliant, two characteristics which frequently accompany
nightmares and daydreams. If everything that we wish for comes true,
then no careful correlation of means to ends is required, while if
nothing that we wish for comes true then no such careful correlation is
feasible.
Likewise, I would have great difficulty appreciating other people
if they were either always in conflict with me or always in cooperation.
When I can revise my goals or develop new ones, new possibilities for
both conflict and cooperation appear on the horizon. Yet, given
Sartre's argument that other people's refusal to fully cooperate with me
help keep me engaged in the real world, the question remains as to
whether I can move f rom the enjoyment of anticipating new
relationships in the future to an enj.oyment of the people and things of
the world in the present moment. Given what Sartre has argued in
Truth and Existence, it is possible to extrapolate the conditions for such
a current enjoyment.
Enjoyment and the Freedom of others
In the aftennath a failed mutual commitment, I could still
possibly enjoy the presence of the other person. The absolute
proximity that I had always actually had in relation to that person is
now brought into a fresh relief precisely because the instruments of the
canceled instrumental complex are now "broken" and the plans are
"blasted." The person can now appear more fully in ways that were
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obseured by the overlay of an instrumental grid. I am now in a better
position to beeome aware of those eharaeteristies of the other person
whieh, while not neeessarily useful, render her or hirn eoneretely
unique.
The other person could also appear to me as more substantial
and less ethereal than before because she or he appears as more
temporally three-dimensional. The person now more elearly appears as
someone who has a past, a present, and a future which are not mine. In
view of this recognition of separateness, I ean now begin to disentangle
the appreeiation that I have for the person as a result of their
distinetiveness from my past enthusiasm over the uses that she or he
might have served.
This is not say that any plans that I might have whieh involve
other people are apriori bad, but simply to suggest that such plans
always risk beeoming temporally one-dimensional. The same eould be
said for plans involving myself, and the danger of my lapsing into a
one-dimensional attitude towards my own life. Sartre's argument on
the relation of ends and means in Truth and Existence imply that
neither I nor my assoeiates are reducible to a program, and that the
attempt to make it so will inevitably generate eonf liet. His description
of the verifying projeet suggests that there are many other enjoyable
aetivities for me to engage in besides attempting to reduee other people
to the status of tools.
Ronald Santoni argues, based upon his reading of Sartre, that to
affirm my own freedom and the freedom of the other person is the
neeessary preeondition f or authentie human relationships.14 Yet,
authentie human relationships may f ail. Sartre reminds us that such
relationships are made and unmade on a daily basis. (TE, 32) An
authentie attitude would be one in whieh I remember and am prepared
to aeeept the fact that even authentie relationships ean unravel. Sartre's
diseussion of enjoyment ean be seen as an attempt on his part to show
why I might want to eontinue to attempt to increase my awareness of
myselt: the world, and the people in it even in the harsh light of failed
efforts, and to develop new plans and perspeetives. In Truth and
Existence, unlike Being and Nothingness, Sartre attempts to show that
there is something genuinely enjoyable about the aetivity of
14 Ronald Santoni, Bad Faith. Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartrels-Early Philosophy.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. p. 165.
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consciousness itself: as weIl as something irritating. He seems to be
intimating that the enjoyment of consciousness can carry us across the
chasm that opens up between blasted plans and new projects.
In Truth and Existence, there is a nuance in Sartre's writing to
the effect that consciousness itself is a worthwhile activity. Granted, he
does not provide indubitable proofs15, and his arguments lack the
attempt at basic and extended demonstrations that one fmds in Being
and Nothingness. In spite ofthis, his arguments in Truth and Existence
on the relation of ends and means, and the implications of those
arguments for human relationships, seem to better square with his more
demanding discussion of temporality in Part Two, Chapter Two of
Being and Nothingness than does his discussion of instrumentalism in
Part Three, Chapter Two of the same work. For Sartre, at least as he
writes in Truth and Existence, it would seem that free human
relationships depend upon our ability to experience and survive the
failure of our plans and to develop new ones in the light of our
recognition of the freedom of others. This insight does not tell us what
other kinds of mutual obligations are entailed in relationships based
upon an ethic of freedom, and it certainly does not suggest that there
are no such obligations, but it does warn us against the assumption of a
false sense ofpotentiality based upon our implicit attempt to view other
people as conveniently useful rather than as inconveniently free.
Loyola University ROGER wmTE
15 See Anderson, Sartre's Two Ethics, op. cit., pp. 59-64 for a discussion ofthe problems
involved in Sartre's ontology for making fundamental valuations of any kind.
63
